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The Faculty of the Law Department and the Board of Editors of the American
Law Register have determined to discontinue the department heretofore known as the
- Progress ot the Law" and to publish in its stead a series of Notes and short Comments
on the most important recent cases. Although fewer cases will thus be treated, yet
inasmuch as there will be fuller discussions of those noted and more frequent references
to similar cases, it is hoped that the change will be a benefit to and will be approved by
our readers. The change takes place in this issm

NOTES.
WHEN A STATE IS A PARTY WITHIN THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT.

On the twenty-second of June, last, the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Arkansas, decided the case
of W'estern Union Telegraph Company v. Andr-ws.1 The decision-raises again the much-mooted question of the circumstances under which a State is a party to a suit against its offiI54 Fed. 95.
(52)
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cials in the performance of their duty as State officers within
the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment. The case under
consideration was as follows: A statute of the State of Arkansas provided that if any foreign corporation doing business in
Arkansas removed any suit from the State to the Federal
Courts they should forfeit their right to do business within
the State. . A penalty of $iooo was provided for every day such
company continued to do business. The second section of the
statute made it the duty of the prosecuting attorneys in the
various counities to sue for these penalties in the name of the
State, for the benefit and use of the county in which the suit
was brought. The suit in the Circuit Court was brought by the
complainant to enjoin the prosecuting attorneys of the several
judicial districts of Arkansas from instituting against it any
proceedings for penalties forfeited under the above statute.
The injunction was refused on the ground that the suit was
within the prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment, passed to stay the wave of indignation which spread through the country as a result of the decision of Chisholn v. Georgia,2 has become since the Civil War
a serious bone of contention in the Federal Courts as a result
of two lines of cases: (i) the attempts of the various Southern
States to resuscitate their finances by means of the creation of
certain bond-issues which were subsequently repudiated, and
(2) the various statutes passed by the States throughout the
last twenty-five years to regulate the rates charged by public
service corporations. The earliest test as to when a State was
a party was that laid down by Chief Justice MARSHALL in
Osborn v. Bank:3 that the appearance or absence of the State
as a party defendant on the record was a criterion that would
determine whether or not the suit was against the State.' The
test was later repudiated, the courts declaring they would look
beyond the record to see if the State was the real party in interest, and a new test was evolved :-whether or not the complainants asked for specific performance against the State. If thV
did, the Court said there could be no relief; the suit was against
the State.' If they did not the Court would take jurisdiction."
22

Dallas, 419 (1793).

a7 Wheaton, 738 (1824).
'Davis v. Grey, 16 Wall. 2o3 (1872).
'Louisiana v. Jumel, 1o7 U. S. 7TU (x882);
117 U. S. 52 (885).

Hagood v. Southern,

'Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531 (1875); Virginia
Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 70 (1884); Pennoyer v. McCofnaughy, i4o
U. S. x; Scott v. Donald, x65 U. S. 58.
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The test was not always applied with substantial accuracy, and
seems to have been abandoned, since the later cases say almost
nothing about it. Then came the famous decisions of Reagan
v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Co.,' and Smyth v. Ames,' which
have been affirmed in a number of cases.10 All these were suit§
to enjoin State officials from prosecuting indictments or suits
for penalties against the defendants for charging rates in excess
of those declared reasonable by a rate-fixing commission
created by State statute-the complaint being thattheratesfixed
were so low as to be a deprivation of property without due
process of law and hence a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of these cases the injunction was granted, the
Court basing its decision on the proposition that as the State
had no pecuniary or proprietary interest in the suit, but merely
a governmental one, the suit could not be against the State."2
In the case of Fitts v. McGhee"2 the injunction was refused
upon similar facts on the ground that in the latter case the
defendants who were not mentioned by name in the statute
were not "specifically charged" with the duty of carrying out
the law in question, as they had been in Reagan v. Co.8 and
Snyth v. Ames.' The distinction of the Court seems questionable in theory, but has never been overruled.23
As in the present case the defendants were specifically
charged with the duty of carrying out the statute, the decision
seems erroneous whether considered in the light of the specific
performance test, that of Reagan v. Co., or that of Fitts v. McGhee. The Court, however, bases its decision on Fitts v. McGhee, bringing.the case within the rule of that decision by sayIng that thestatute in question putting the duty of prosecuting
'In re Ayers, 123 U. S.443 (x887); Hagood v. Southern, xx7 U. S.
52 (where of plaintiff's three prayers it woula seem that only two

amount to specific performance and yet the bill was dismissed).
1554 U. S.362 (1894).
1i69 U. S. 466 (x8g8).
" Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Tompkins, x76 U. S. 167 (igoo);

Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 544 (i9o2); Mississippi R. R. Commission v.
Illinois Central R. R., 203 U. S. 235 (x9o6); Central Consolidated Gas

Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. iso (igo6).
'Reagan v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. at p. 39o.
s z72
U. S. S16 (1899). It is interesting to note that this decision
was pronounced only a year later than Smyth v. Ames by the same
court which pronounced the latter decision-the opinion in both cases
being by Justice Harlan.

"3As a matter of fact, the 'tatute in Smytv. Ames nowhere seems

to charge the Attorney-General or the board with the special duty of

bringing suits for penalties or instituting criminal prosecution. (House
Roll No. 33, Nebraska Statutes for 1893.)
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the suits for penalties upon the prosecuting attorneys of the
various counties was merely declarative of their duty under
the general laws of the State, and interpret the "special
charging" of Fitts v. McGhee to mean "an administrative duty
such as is exercised by boards or ministerial officers, but not
attorneys." The Federal Courts have, however, frequently
enjoined attorneys-general from bringing suit.1' It is also true
of all these cases that the duties laid upon the attorney-general
by the statutes in question were merely declaratory of his duty
to prosecute all suits for penalties incurred under State statutes
and hence this distinction of the Court, too, seems to fall. The
Court considered the penalties collectible for the benefit of the
counties sufficient to give the State a pecuniary interest in the
result. In a long line of decisions, however, the collection of penalties forfeited to the State have been enjoined."
In both these, respects the case seems to carry the
principle of the Eleventh Amendment beyond any of its immediate predecessors, and the result of an appeal to the
Supreme Court, if taken, should be awaited with interest. The
question is one of ever-increasing importance, and appeals from
the Circuit Courts of North Carolina and Minnesota" involving bimilar questions under the Eleventh Amendment are now
pending before the Supreme Court.

LIABILITY OF WHOLESALE MANUFACTURER TO CONSUMER.

The numerical weight of American authorities supports the
doctrine that there is generally no liability of a manufacturer
for injury to one purchasing from a dealer caused by defects
due to negligence in the manufacture of those articles.' Three
reasons are stated for this rule: First, that injury is not probable; second, that the agency of the dealer is an intervening.
independent cause, and third, that public policy requires such a
limit of liability of the manufacturer. It is submitted that in
the case of latent defects, the first two reasons are unsound
as being inconsistent with the law of negligence; for as to the
first, there is an evident probability of danger-and as to the
'Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., x54 U. S. 362; Smyth v.

Ames, i69 U. S. 466; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. v. Tompkins, i76 U. S.

167; Prout v. Starr, iS8 U. S. 544 Huverhill Gas Co. v. Barker, zog Fed.
694 (9oi); Con-ohdated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. :5c (igo6).
15
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Missouri, K. & T. R. R. Co. v.
Missnuri Railroad Commissioners, 183 U. S. 53 (1901); Chicago, St. P.
& M. R. R. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167; Prout v. Starr, x88 U. S. 544;
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, 146 Fed. i5o (xgo6).
'JEx Porte Long.
1
lHuset v. I. I. Case Machine Co., i2o Fed. 86_.
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second, the mere passage of the article through the hands of an
intermediate person who could not discover the defect does not
constitute an intervening independent cause. If public policy
is to decide the question, it should be noted further that the
rule is in conflict with the common law principle which requires
that a man should exercise care in the conduct of his business,2
this duty being imposed because of the remunerative character
of his employment, although the consideration need not necessarily move from the plaintiff. Thus, a physician has been held
liable for negligence in treating plaintiff's wound, although he
was hired by a third personA The rule of exemption from
liability does not, despite dicta to the contrary, senem to be supported by the English' cases, nor by those of New York$ or
Minnesota.'
Moreover, there are admitted exceptions, and these exceptions "are as well defined and settled as the rule itself."1 One
of these exceptions exists in the case of negligence in the manufacture of articles which are "intended to preserve, destroy or
affect human life."' Parenthetically,-it would seem that these
" exceptions" are merely the most obvious instances of the application of the common law principle above referred to, but
as the principle has been submerged these instances are left
isolated. Within the scope of this exception, are explosives,'
drugs$ and foods.'
The recent case of Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 65 AtI. Rep.
883 (N. J.), held that a declaration was demurrable which alleged that the plaintiff had been made sick by eating diseased
ham bought from a retailer, but negligently packed by the defendant wholesaler. The Court rested its decision upon a principle of contract law; i. e., that there is no implied warranty of
wholesomeness by a manufacturer in the sale of food to a retail
dealer, a conclusion that seems supported by the weight of
authority.20
It would seem, however, that the denial of the existence of
such a warranty should not bar the plaintiff's claim, which was
framed in tort. In fact, even if such a warranty had existed it
'See Mr. Boblen's essay on "The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in

the Law of Torts," pp. 6, zo, 5i-xor.
'Pippin v. Shepard, ii Price, 4rx.
'George v. Skihington, I- R. 5 Ex. i; Dalyrell v. Tyson, 96 -. C. L.
K; cf. Wiinterbottom v. Wright, io M. & W. iog (dicta).
'Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470; cf. Fox v. Buffalo Co., 21 App. Div.
N. Y. 321.
'Shubert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 33!.
'Peters v. Johnson,41 S. E. i9o (W. Va.).
'Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 497.
'Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411.
"Benjamin on Sales, Sec. 671.
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could not have bound the defendant to whom the plaintiff was
a stranger. The Court ignored the real ground upon which the
plaintiff's claim rested; i. c., the breach of a duty imposed by
law. It is submitted that the case falls within the exception to
the general rule as to liability of manufacturers, which exists
in the case of an article "intended to preserve, destroy or affect
human life." In the case cited above, 9 which so held. it is said:
"The furnishing of provisions which endanger human life or
health stands clearly upon the same ground as the administering
of improper medicines, from which a liability springs, irrespective of any question of privity between the parties."
LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS UPON

UNPAID STOCK SUB-

SCRIPTION.
The liability of a stockholder upon his unpaid stock subscription to the corporate creditor, has always been worked out
through the fictional person of the corporate entity, on the
ground that the entity is the debtor of the corporate creditor.
The problem has always been to devise some theory by which
to prevent the stockholder from asserting rights, which are
perfectly valid against the entity, in order to give the corporate
creditor a greater right against the stockholder than that possessed by the entity itself. Two theories have been advanced.
The "trust fund" doctrine regards the capital stock as a trust
fund for the benefit of the creditors. When the stockholder
attempts to escape liability, by settling up claims 'vhich are
good as against the entity, as for example, a set-off or a release, but which would prevent any remedy to the creditor, he
finds that the claims are no longer mutual, and cannot be set up
against each other. This theory has been severely criticised.
It is admitted that in the strict sense of the word there is no
trust; that it is a misnomer; and that what is meant, is merely
admisistration of assets in equity.' If that is so, the "trust
fund" theory does not explain why the creditor should be given
a greater right against the stockholder than that possessed by
the entity. The other theory gives relief on the ground of
fraud, in an action of deceit. It is said that the creditor is presumed to rely upon the stated capital of the entity, as security,
and that when stock is issued, purporting to be fully paid up,
when, in fact, it is not, he is deceived. The stockholder who
accepts such stock is guilty of a misrepresentation, because he
holds out the entity as possessing its capital stock fully paid up,
'Hoilins v. Brierfied Coal and Iron Co., 15o U. S. 371 (1893);
McDonald v. Willians, 174 U. S. 397 (899); O'Brear Jewelry Co. v.
Volfer & Co., io6 Ala. 2o5 (894); Cook on Corporations (5th Ed.).
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when it is not, and is compelled to make good his representation.2 when any person advances credit to the entity in reliance
thereon. But if credit is advanced prior to the issue of the
stock, or with notice that it was not in fact paid up, there
could be no reliance, 2 and, therefore, no recovery on the ground
of fraud. The entity cannot recover, because of the release.
But this theory does not explain why a stockholder is not allowed a set-off of a valid claim against the entity, when the
stock is not issued as fully paid up with a release from further
payment. Because a creditor has notice that a balance of the
stock subscription is still unpaid, subject to call, he is not prevented from compelling the stockholder to pay it, and the"
authorities agree that no set-off is allowed.8 Therefore, the
fraud theory is also unsatisfactory, and we have no theory
which does account for the liability of the stockholder upon
his unpaid stock subscription, when we regard the entity as
the debtor of the corporate creditor. Justice to the creditor
demands the enforcement of this liability. There is a consistent solution for it
To-day, when a certain solution of a corporate problem is
demanded by justice, and it cannot be reached by working out
the problem through the fictional entity, some courts absolutely
disregard' the entity; and instead, consider the stockholders as
a group of associates with joint assets and liabilities.' Such
decisions are notices to the entity to quit. The solution that
has been reached in the problem before us, demands that the
entity be disregarded. It is a fiction, and as such implies that
the truth is otherwise. It is merely a substitute for a real explanation, and can have no permanent place in a sound legal
system.8 The stockholders, not the entity, owe the creditor. 6 At
common law they were liable to him without limit.? The limitation" is a modern doctrine. If we regard the entity as the
'Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 48 Minn. 174 (i82).
'Bickley v. Schlag, 46 N. J. Eq. 533 (1890).
'United States v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247
(oo5) ; Atty. Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137 (1892); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., '93 U. S. gg (5903); Mobile v. Watson, 116

U. S. 289 (1886).

*See artice by Mr. George Wharton Pepper entitled, "A Brief Introduction to the Study of the Law of Associations," 49 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 255, pp. 258-259.
'See same article, pp. 266-267.
'See article by Mr. Samuel Williston entitled, "History of the Law
of Business Corporations before 18oo," 2 Har. Law Rev. 1o5, 148, pp.
16o-162. Also Dr. Salnon v. The Hansborough Company, Ch. Cas. 294;
6 Vin. Abr. 310 (164); Hume v. Windyard and Wando Canal Co., I
Car. L J. 217 (I826).
'Carr
v. Inuglebart,3 Ohio St. 457 (1854).
' See article by Mr. George Wharton Pepper entitled, "Irregular Associations," 52 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 409, 504, 576, pp. 432-435.

NOTES.

debtor, it is correct conclusion. A creditor can only look to the
assets of his debtor for payment.10 But this limitation of the
liability has not changed its nature. It is that of co-debtor, and
until the limit is reached the problem is the same as though no
limit were imposed.! No one would contend that co-debtors
could defeat the claims of their common creditor by an agreement inter se, releasing each other from liability, nor would it
be possible to conceive of co-debtors setting off claims, which
they had against each other, when sued by the common creditor. Such claims can only be asserted when the rights inter 4e
are determined, and can have nothing to do with the right of
the common'creditor against the individual associate. The
interposition of the entity as debtor, has merely served to confuse these two distinct sets of rights. This view readily explains why a stockholder upon a subsequent issue of stock, is
not liable to a prior creditor, because in no sense of the word
did he contract the debt. But notice on the part of the creditor, that stock was not, in fact, paid up, though issued as such,
should not necessarily bar him, if we regard the associates as
co-debtors, and it would not be necessary to pass a statute to
accomplish such v desired result, nor to resort to grounds of
public policy in order to construe a statute to intend such.21
Neither single debtors nor co-debtors can restrict their liability
to certain specific assets, by merely hanging up a notice of
their intention. There must be an express stipulation to that
effect in the contract with the creditor.22
Since stockholders are co-debtors, after judgnent is
obtained against the group, each is liable severally for the
whole debt-within the limit of his restricted liability-and
therefore a creditor need not join all the associates.1 5 But the
principle of marshalling requires that he first exhaust the joint
assets, by a return of nulla bona, before proceeding against the
individual associate. In order to prevent multiplicity of suits,
and settle the right inter se in the same action, those associates
who are sued, have the right to file a bill to have all the other
stockholders joined.15 If the creditor is also an associate, he
need only contribute his own pro rata share towards the payment of his own claim ;23 and should not be compelled to pay
his own stock balance in full, as a condition precedent to suit.' t
In re Sheffield and South Yorkshire Permanent Bid. Soc., 22 Q. B.

D. 476 (1889).

"Easton Nat. Bank v. Am. Brick and Tile Co., 64 AtL (N. J.) 9x7

(igo6).
Greenwood's Case,3 De G. M. & G.459 ( 844) ; Hess v. Wertz, 4 S.
& R. 356 (18x8).
' Bissel v. Kty., 15 Fed. 353 (1882) ; Wilson v. Kiesel, 9 Utah, 397
(1894).
" Cook on Corporations (5th Ed.), Sec. 205, p. 405; dI. Weber v.
Fickey, 47 Md. i96 (1877).

'Hatch v. Dana, zoi U. S. 2o5 (iB79).
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And since as a creditor he need not join all his associates, the
whole claim of the associate will be apportioned among those
before the court, the creditor-associate contributing his own
proportion. Blood v. La Serene Land and Water Co., 89 Pac.
(Cal.), io9o (1907).
It is submitted that such a decision cannot be satisfactorily
explained, if the entity is regarded as the debtor, unless some
other theory than the two above mentioned, is discovered. If
we regard the associates as the debtors, the case needs no explanation. The same result has been reached in cases where
the associates are admitted to be co-debtors--viz. partners.2
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Right of City to Dispose of Surplus Electric Power for
Private Purposes.
The general form of government in the United States, with
its three-fold division of powers, exercised by the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial departments, early influenced the
courts in favor of the view that the functions of each department, were, except, perhaps, in extreme situations, to be exercised independent of the others and free from interference
by them, and that there existed, therefore, a point beyond
which the judicial department could not go in regulating the
acts of either the legislative or the executive branches.'
This rule has been held applicable to the acts of municipal
corporations, which are but sub-divisions of the sovereign government, with powers delegated by the Legislature, and hence
the Supreme Court of New York refused to reverse, on certiorari, the proceedings of a municipal corporation relating to
certain street improvements, where it appeared that it had acted
w-thin the scope of the authority conferred by a statute of the
Legislature, and had complied with the forms which the statute
required.2
And this same Court held that "Courts of Equity have
no general supervisory power over the government of municipal
corporations or over acts and proceedings of their governing
bodies .....
except where it is shown that the rights of an
individual have been injured or menaced in a matter falling
under some recognized head of equity, and which it is the
peculiar province of a court of equity to prevent or redress."s
"In re ProfessionalLife Assurance Co., L R- 3 Eq. Cas. 668 (x867).
•Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch, U. S. 137 (18o3); Rees v. City of
Watertown, 19 Wall U. S. io7 (x873).'
'Ex parse Mayor, &c. of Albany, ig Wend. N. Y. 277 (I84o).
'Phelps v. City of Watertown, 6x Barb. N. Y. 121 (1871).
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Where, however, the exercise of a legislative function by a
body having but a delegated power contravenes the authority
derived from the supreme governing body, the courts have not
hesitated to intervene for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of parties whose rights were injuriously affected; 4 or to
prevent funds raised for specific purposes or from specific
activities, from being diverted into general channels.'
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has recently applied
the general rule to a situation which marks a modern and growing tendency in municipal activity. Crouch v. City of McKinney, io4 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 518 (907.)
The City -of McKinney, acting under legislative authority,
had issued bonds for the purpose of establishing a public electric lighting system in the city. The funds thus procured were
insufficient, however, to extend the system throughout the city's
territorial limits, but to the extent that the system was in operation, the lighting plant was adequate to supply sufficient power
and to have a surplus. This surplus it purposed disposing of to
private parties for compensation, and to use current funds of
the city to effectuate this purpose. The lighting plant had been
installed in conjunction with a municipal water plant. The McKinney Electric Light & Motor Power Company, which had
previously received from the city a franchise to install a lighting plant and supply private parties with light and power,
sought to restrain the city from thus disposing of its surplus
electricity.
The Court, in refusing to enjoin the city, held that, "So
long as the affairs of a city are conducted by its council in a
reasonably judicial manner, its acts will not be interfered with
by the courts, unless it is transcending its powers, or a clear
right has been withheld, or a wrong perpetrated or threatened,"
and that the city "may, after discharging its duty to the public,
sell its surplus electricity to private citizens for lighting."
It was further held that, "The surplus of the proceeds of a
municipal water works system remaining after the payment of
the expenses of maintaining the system as installed, are current funds, and the city may divert the same to other needs of
the city."
The decision would seem to be a much desired step in favor
of the successful administration of municipal affairs where relief from stringent situations is possible by such use of the
city's funds, otherwise unavailable, except through the usually
tedious medium of legislation.
' Cent. Dig. (Am. Ed.), vol. 36, tit. Munic. Corp., Secs. 1868, 1869.

